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In Seattle (seen above) on December 2, 1999, during the WTO Ministerial Conference there, the Cordell Hull Institute and the Centre for International Economics, Canberra, held a one-day seminar for the Cairns Group Farm Leaders on the issues for a first WTO round of multilateral trade negotiations.

The seven papers for the meeting were published in advance as *Reason versus Emotion: Requirements for a Successful WTO Round* (Canberra: RIRDC, 1999).



Reproduced here is the paper by **Clayton Yeutter** (above).

About the Author

Clayton Yeutter, Of Counsel at Hogan & Hartson, attorneys-at-law, in Scottsdale, AZ, played a critical role when the U.S. Trade Representative

SEMINAR IN SEATTLE...

Critical Role of the Cairns Group in Liberalizing Farm Trade

Clayton Yeutter

SECURING international agreement on the liberalization of trade in farm produce has been a struggle of epic proportions. Meaningful reforms were achieved for the first time in the Uruguay Round negotiations of 1986-94.¹ Many played a part in that achievement. But the role of the Cairns Group of agricultural-exporting countries was critical: first, in helping to launch the negotiations; second, in maintaining the focus on agricultural trade; and, third, in pushing the major trading powers towards an agreement on agriculture, one that entailed specific binding commitments on domestic support, market access and export subsidies.

Time and again the Cairns Group provided a balance wheel to the ideological differences over agriculture between the European Community and the United States, nearly always leading to a constructive outcome. Throughout the negotiations the Cairns Group was catalytic, sensible and pragmatic.

The significance of the Cairns Group's role in liberalizing trade in farm produce can be plainly seen when the Uruguay Round negotiations are put in an historical perspective. Consider for a moment, from a Cairns Group country's point of view, what has happened over the past half century.

An Historical Perspective

After World War II, the United States and Britain, along with other countries, established the multilateral trading system founded on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. As the twin pillars of the international economic order, the GATT dealt with the real side of the world economy, while the International Monetary Fund, established at Bretton Woods, has dealt with the payments side.

These days, people take for granted the benefits of the international economic order and, indeed, have forgotten the

(1985-88) in launching the Uruguay Round negotiations and then, as the U.S. Secretary of Agriculture (1989-91), in the crunch period of the negotiations in dealing with agriculture.

Dr Yeutter was later chairman of the Republican National Committee and counsellor to the President for domestic policy.

Before becoming the U.S. Trade Representative, Dr Yeutter was president of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (1978-85).

About the Meeting

The meeting was attended by about 450 from NGOs, labor unions, the media and so on who were in Seattle to observe the WTO ministerial conference.

Besides **Dr Yeutter**, the following presented papers at the meeting: **Guido Di Tella**, Argentina's Minister of Foreign Affairs; **Robert Litan**, vice president and director of economic studies at the Brookings Institution; and **Robert L. Thompson**, director of rural development at the World Bank.

Others who spoke were **Brian Chamberlin**, New Zealand farm leader; **Hugh Corbet**, president of the Cordell Hull Institute; **Victoria Curzon Price**, of the University of Geneva; and **Andrew Stoeckel**, executive director of the Center for International Economics.

virulent economic nationalism of the inter-war period. So it is worth recalling how the GATT system was the culmination of years of perseverance by Cordell Hull, initially in the Congress of the United States and then as Secretary of State.

Cordell Hull's name is usually associated in the United States with the Good Neighbor policy towards Latin America, the diplomatic side of World War II and the founding of the United Nations. In my view his most important legacy, following the autarkic and discriminatory excesses of the 1930s, was the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and his inspiration of plans, during the war, for a rules-based multilateral trade regime as the basis for pursuing peace and prosperity.²

Adherence to GATT rules played a major part in the post-war restoration of orderly conditions to world commerce and greatly facilitated the liberalization of international trade in the 1950s and 1960s. But adherence to GATT rules deteriorated in the 1970s. By the early 1980s, the multilateral trading system was in a parlous state which, ultimately, led to the Uruguay Round negotiations.

The principal purpose of the Uruguay Round negotiations was to strengthen the GATT system. The marathon effort produced the World Trade Organization (WTO), which came into being in 1995 to administer the GATT itself and 28 Uruguay Round agreements, including the one that has begun to put agriculture on the same international footing as other economic activities.

Agriculture as a "Special Case"

From the outset, agriculture was covered by the GATT, but ironically it was insulated from the GATT's trade-liberalizing process. That is why, years later, I and others would speak of "bringing trade in agricultural products into the GATT system". Primary products, mainly meaning agriculture, were mentioned in four of the 38 GATT articles. The language in Articles VI and XX posed few problems. But Articles XI and XVI were something else.

Article XI (2)(c) exempted agricultural products from the general ban on import quotas, although only to the degree "necessary to the enforcement of government measures" in certain situations (essentially when domestic production was being restricted). The United States, however, could not find a way to get around the conflict between the GATT's prohibition of quantitative import restrictions and the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 in which section 22 provided for the imposition of quantitative import restrictions. Accordingly, the United States sought and obtained, in 1955, a "waiver" of Article XI on a promise that it would be temporary. ('Temporary' turned out to be 40 years.)

Article XVI (3) exempted agricultural products from the general ban on export subsidies as long as countries using them did not

exceed their "equitable shares" of world trade in the product in question. (Of course "equitable shares" were never defined.) When the GATT was negotiated it was agreed that all export subsidies would be ended by the beginning of 1958. When the time came, however, the United States found it expedient to continue to employ export subsidies for wheat, cotton and some lesser commodities.

The U.S. double standard on agricultural trade in the 1950s was most unfortunate. But the United States did not have a monopoly on hypocrisy. The continental European countries maintained even more restrictive import regimes for agricultural products which, with their inconvertible currencies at the time, were justified on balance-of-payments grounds under GATT Article XII.

Agriculture aside, dramatic progress was made in lowering barriers to international trade, achieved through negotiations on two fronts.

- In the 1950s, through the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), quantitative import restrictions on trade in manufactured goods among developed countries were substantially dismantled, helped by the leverage that Marshall Aid provided.
- Also in the 1950s and into the 1960s, through six "rounds" of multilateral GATT negotiations, tariffs on manufactured goods traded among developed countries were steadily reduced to low levels.

All that was well and good. But the leaders of the major trading countries neglected two sets of issues that today threaten the viability of the multilateral trading system. Nothing was done to liberalize trade in products of export interest to developing countries — the kind that are produced as economies industrialize. And no impact was made on the rising trend of protection accorded to farmers in developed countries.

Agricultural policies in developed countries have ratcheted up price support measures and the import restrictions required to sustain them. Even so, with generally rising standards of living throughout much of the world, agricultural producers in the Americas and Oceania were able to expand exports, but only to a limited extent. What has been happening is described by economists as an incredible distortion of international competition and it has been happening on an increasingly large scale over most of the past four decades.

Kennedy Round Negotiations

Matters took a turn for the worse when in the 1960s, during the sixth GATT round, the European Community gave priority to negotiating acceptance of its common agricultural policy (CAP). In

those negotiations (as a result of GATT discussions on the Haberler Report of 1958³) the liberalization of agricultural trade became for the first time a priority of the United States.

On this the “new Europe” and the United States were at distinct cross-purposes.

Towards the end of the Kennedy Round negotiations, France proposed a *montan de soutien* approach for agriculture. But nobody knew how serious France was and, in any case, the five-year negotiating authority of the United States (under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962) was running out.

The CAP consolidated, in a more protectionist direction, the variable import-levy systems of the European Community’s original six member countries. From the late 1960s onward, the CAP became a greater source of disarray in world agriculture, increasingly distorting international trade and provoking hostility in relations with low-cost agricultural-exporting countries around the world. How that came about is not difficult to understand.

The CAP system’s instruments of support and protection varied from commodity to commodity. Fundamentally, the system was based on price-support measures, with producer prices set high enough to provide for the economic wellbeing of small farmers. Annually adjusted CAP prices were nearly always far above “world” prices, with import levies varied as necessary. As it was extended, the CAP system became more and more complex, as well as more and more difficult to manage — and, correspondingly, more and more open to abuse.

Artificially high prices provided a huge incentive for European farmers to produce more and technological advances further stimulated production. Thus the European Community’s agriculture developed through three stages: the reduction of “production deficits” in its main commodities, the attainment of self-sufficiency in one commodity after another and ultimately the generation of surpluses — which had to be stored, destroyed or sold abroad.

Surplus disposal abroad could be done only with the help of export subsidies. These depressed international prices, lowering the foreign-exchange earnings of all agricultural-exporting countries. In the process, farmers in other countries were often obliged to cut production — and were sometimes forced off the land altogether. The effect of European (and U.S.) export subsidies has been to export unemployment to other countries, especially to agrarian developing economies.

Nowadays the word “dumping” is used very freely — often where foreign competition is too much for domestic suppliers. Indeed, there was a time when dumping meant selling in a foreign market at prices below those in the home market and, since international

price discrimination is economically rational in international business, it was necessary to demonstrate predatory behavior.

If export subsidies were used in other activities (such as the steel industry) as they have come to be used in the agricultural sector they would be excoriated, in the media and legislatures, as out-and-out dumping. They represent predatory behavior and resulted in the European Community winning a larger market share than it could have won through open (unsubsidized) competition.

Tokyo Round Negotiations

After the Kennedy Round negotiations, the United States began preparing for the next GATT round, anxious to maintain the momentum of trade liberalization. The European Community continued to focus on its own enlargement. In 1973 the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark — relatively open markets for agricultural products — joined the Community and the CAP system. Matters there took a turn for the worse as CAP distortions were extended to three more countries.

Matters also took a turn for the worse in other respects. The Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates broke down. Developed countries resorted to non-tariff measures, especially subsidies and “voluntary” export restraints, dubbed the “new protectionism”. Then the World Food Crisis emerged. The Third World, having long concluded that the GATT was a “rich man’s club”, started campaigning for a “new international economic order”. And the onset of the Great Stagflation complicated life everywhere. “Chickens were coming home to roost” in economic policy everywhere.

Following the Smithsonian Accord, which settled the international monetary crisis, the United States was finally able to secure agreement on a new GATT round, which was formally launched in September 1973. That was quickly followed by the War of Yom Kippur, the first oil-payments crisis and the Watergate scandal. Thus the Tokyo Round negotiations did not get down to business until February 1975, after the U.S. Administration got “fast track” trade-negotiating authority (set out in the Trade Act of 1974).

By then it was readily apparent that liberalizing agricultural trade had to entail fundamental reform of farm-support policies. But thoughts of doing so were vigorously resisted by European leaders who claimed the CAP was “the cement that held the Community together”. The “spirit of European unity”, it seems, was not strong enough to reform agricultural policy.

Farm-support policies and the resultant trade distortions had contributed heavily to the World Food Crisis.⁴ But with shortages and starvation in poor countries, along with the opening of the Soviet markets, came buoyant commodity prices. So in the

European Community, the crisis vindicated the CAP system, while farmers in the Americas and Oceania were relieved to be getting better returns — if only for a while.

Whatever the earlier interest in a *montan de soutien* approach to liberalizing agricultural trade, the European Community remained bent on the antithesis, market-sharing agreements. There is a difference between trade expansion and trade liberalization. The former can be achieved through subsidies, as many industries have demonstrated, shipbuilding perhaps most conspicuously. The latter is about raising standards of living through competition and specialization.

Conducting the Tokyo Round negotiations in a climate of “stagflation” was tough going (I can say with feeling from having been there). It was made more difficult, but also made necessary, by the resort to the “new protectionism”. It was all that the governments in North America and Western Europe could do to hold the line.

In 1978, as its negotiating authority was running out, the United States and the European Community took agriculture off the negotiating table. They were at cross-purposes as much as ever, saw no prospect of agreement in the time left and did not want to jeopardize an agreement on industrial products. In the end the overall Tokyo Round outcome was modest — as would soon be crystal clear.

Uruguay Round Negotiations

The Tokyo Round agreements, signed in November 1979, made no appreciable difference to mounting protectionist pressures and measures. As the GATT system neared collapse, a “crisis” GATT Ministerial Conference was held in November 1982, but it failed to come to grips with the protectionist threat.

Thus began the long tussle in Geneva to launch an eighth GATT round. The United States pressed for negotiations to extend the GATT system to trade in services, international investment and intellectual property rights — issues of growing importance to international businesses. (It also pressed for negotiations on trade in high-tech products.) But other countries were against “new issues” being broached when “old issues” of critical interest to them, including agricultural trade, had not been resolved. On all sides, however, there was alarm over weakening adherence to GATT rules, as well as discontent with the GATT’s lengthy, indecisive dispute-settlement process.

As developing countries recognized that their demands for a new international economic order were going nowhere, they started participating more fully in the GATT system (which is what many economists had urged all along). But some major developing

countries dug in their heels over putting trade in services on the negotiating agenda. On the old issues, the European Community again resisted the inclusion of agriculture, and then maneuvered again for the objective to be market-sharing agreements.

When the Geneva "talks about talks" got close to agreement, it was decided (after a vote was forced) to hold a Ministerial Conference in Punta de Este, Uruguay. There the necessary political decisions could be made on the final agenda and the launching of a new GATT round.

For 40 years, the smaller agricultural-exporting countries, none financially able to subsidize farmers, had watched powerlessly as agriculture was treated in the GATT system as a 'special case'. Now commodity markets were in the doldrums. A full-scale subsidy war between the European Community and the United States had broken out. Agricultural prices were at record low levels. These countries had had a 'guts full' of the way the 'leading' industrial countries, the Group of Seven, handled international trade issues. They were determined that this time agriculture would not be left behind.

In March 1986 officials from a small group of these countries met in Montevideo, Uruguay, and in July a wider group met in Pattaya, Thailand. These meetings prepared the way for a gathering in August of trade ministers in Cairns, near the Great Barrier Reef, chaired by John Dawkins, Australia's Minister for Trade.

Australia had learnt a lesson from its bitter experiences in GATT discussions where it had too few allies and its proposals, however reasonable and well argued, were quickly isolated and ignored. It was joined in the Cairns Group by Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Paraguay, the Philippines, Thailand and Uruguay.

The Cairns Group accounted for a quarter of world trade in farm products. At Punta del Este, it immediately made itself felt as a "third force", collaborating with the United States to get trade liberalization firmly set as the goal of the agriculture negotiations in the new GATT round.

It would be an understatement to say that the Cairns Group played an important part in the subsequent negotiations. For now it will suffice to focus on two crises.

In December 1988, at the ministerial "mid-term" review of the negotiations in Montreal, the European Community continued to be obdurate over how to go about liberalizing agricultural trade. The Cairns Group ministers were concerned that we Americans were not being tough enough (although we also had "other fish to fry"), so they forced a halt in the negotiations until a way forward was found on agriculture.

In December 1990, at the Ministerial Conference in Brussels, where the negotiations were meant to be concluded, the European Community was still stalling. Only a few weeks before had the Community put forward in Geneva its proposals on agriculture. Some believe to this day that the Community was banking on others in the Group of Seven putting agriculture aside in the interests of wrapping up agreements on other issues. Whatever ... The Cairns Group walked out.

When the Uruguay Round negotiations were concluded in December 1993, the Agreement on Agriculture was at least a start in liberalizing farm trade — the first start ever. It included a commitment to resume negotiations in 1999 as a part of a “built-in agenda” for the next round under the WTO’s auspices. Actual liberalization was modest, although disciplines on the European Community’s export subsidies have pinched in some areas, while tariffication has made many import restrictions embarrassingly transparent. The big push to liberalize agricultural trade would have to wait for “next time”.

Preparing for “Next Time”

Since the Uruguay Round agreements the Cairns Group, still chaired by Australia, has continued to work together. Hungary has dropped out in order to join the European Community, but South Africa has joined and three more Latin American countries — Costa Rica, Guatemala and Bolivia — are expected to join by the end of the year. Ministers have met six times and reasserted their determination to pursue the liberalization of agricultural trade. At the meeting in Sydney in April 1998 they agreed a “vision” statement on their objectives in the WTO negotiations that are to be resumed after the third Ministerial Conference in Seattle at the end of 1999.⁵ In the meantime, officials cooperate in WTO meetings, in the Committee on Agriculture and the Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures.

These are not the best of times for farmers anywhere. Once again we have seen that the difference between feast and famine in agriculture is very narrow. For US farmers, after excellent years earlier in the decade, hog prices some months ago dipped to 1930s depression levels. Most other commodity groups experienced similar, though not quite so dramatic, price declines. Farmers elsewhere in the world have struggled, too, for the marketplace for agriculture is global. All of us in this world want to eat; and, if we can afford it, we want to try for a better diet tomorrow than we have today.

What went wrong, after the high expectations and bullish predictions of just a few years ago? In economic terms, nothing inexplicable. Farmers and the entire food industry, for that matter, got hit with a double whammy. Superb weather conditions in much of the world boosted food supplies at the same time that

purchasing power tumbled in a host of countries. The "Asian flu" torpedoed the world's fastest growing markets for food products, the Russian market collapsed and even Western Europe suffered through a period of low economic growth. The combination of a fall-off in demand and rising supplies was devastating. To no one's surprise, prices declined rapidly, often precipitously.

So what was to be done in response to this distressing situation? As usual, both short-term and long-term answers were required.

In the short run, governments are seeking to sustain the viability of their farm sectors through revenue transfers, which is appropriate and should be possible without violating WTO commitments and obligations. There are a variety of ways to do this — through crop insurance, international food aid programs and direct payments to farmers that meet WTO "green box" criteria.

In the long run, macroeconomic policies come to the fore and we will have a healthy agricultural sector globally, provided governments do a good job in this complex area. Fiscal, monetary and trade policies will determine rates of economic growth in this world and determine, thereby, whether people have the wherewithal and the willingness to spend more than they do today on food.

Objectives of Agricultural Reform

For now let us concentrate on trade policy and, more specifically, on agricultural trade reforms that can brighten the future of the world's most productive farmers, wherever they are located.

When the Uruguay Round negotiations were launched, world trade in agriculture was horrendously distorted, far more so than in any other major industry. I have often described it as a freight train out of control. In the end, the negotiations appreciably slowed the train, enough for negotiators now to have a good chance of turning it around in the right direction and then give it a shove. If that can be accomplished in the forthcoming WTO round there should be, in a few years time, a 'level playing field' in agriculture. Thereafter farm organizations can devote more attention to fiscal, monetary and tax issues, and less to costly and never ending trade disputes.

Such an outcome, which would have seemed utopian a decade or so ago, is now a reasonable probability. The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture laid the groundwork. The new WTO round needs to complete the structure. Here is what the negotiators must try to accomplish.

Elimination of Export Subsidies

First, all export subsidies should be phased out and prohibited forevermore. The United States advocated that position in the Uruguay Round negotiations, but it was just too big a leap for one

negotiation. This task must be finished in the new WTO round — as was done years ago for industrial products. Export subsidies are inherently trade-distorting and put smaller agricultural-exporting countries at an impossible competitive disadvantage.

Large Increase in Market Access

Second, negotiators need to do a lot of work on import restrictions to truly open markets to international competition. The Uruguay Round negotiations also laid the groundwork for this by converting agricultural non-tariff barriers (which are often difficult to discern, identify or quantify) into visible tariffs. But some of those tariffs are incredibly high! In the new WTO round not only should average tariffs be lowered in the traditional way, but all tariffs should be capped and 'bound' at relatively low levels.

The new WTO round needs also to improve the way tariffs are administered, particularly where tariff quotas are involved. Existing quotas should be increased dramatically and "over quota" tariffs should be brought down a long, long way. The WTO round may not make the world of agriculture free of tariffs, but it ought to reduce the influence of tariffs to minimal levels.

It is high time "sacred cows" were confronted. Every country has them. These are the most politically sensitive products of all — for example, sugar in the United States and the European Union, dairy products in Canada and rice in Japan. Many others could be added to the list.

For more than half a century, these sacred cows escaped being subjected in previous GATT rounds to international disciplines. But in an increasingly interdependent world this just cannot continue. Unless the regulatory regimes for these products are reformed in a manner similar to the reforms already under way for other product groups, resentment will build and ultimately explode. Progress here will not come easily, but WTO member countries must give this issue much more attention than ever before.

Reduction of Domestic Support

If WTO negotiators do their jobs well on both export subsidies and market access, they need not spend a great deal of time on disciplines for traditional production subsidies. If a country's agricultural markets are open to international competition and if its export subsidies are being phased out, it will have to apply its own disciplines to production subsidies. Otherwise it will have a mountain of surpluses generated by those subsidies and nowhere to go with them.

Timing, however, is everything. Export subsidies will not be eliminated overnight; and tariff reductions will be phased over a period, probably a decade. So some attention will have to be given

to how additional disciplines on production subsidies fit within and complement other agricultural trade reforms.

Transparency in State-trading Entities

A number of WTO member countries have state-trading entities to handle certain of their agricultural exports, and some of those entities administer production policies as well. This monopolistic positioning inevitably leads to charges that such entities are engaging in predatory practices, subsidizing exports in violation of WTO commitments or dumping surpluses on the world market.

The actions of most state-trading entities are not at all transparent. That has to change. In a global marketplace an unwillingness to be forthcoming about what one has done, and how one has done it, is intolerable. Negotiators can and will argue about what transparency requires, but there should be no argument in the new WTO round about the need for transparency. Should state-trading entities continue to stonewall in this regard, competing entities will begin to take matters in their own hands. For example, dumping laws provide for the use of "constructed" prices or "best information available" when a party alleged to have dumped product is unwilling to provide essential pricing data. If state-trading entities are not more forthcoming, they may well be subjected to treatment of this nature.

Food Safety and Sound Science

One of the unheralded achievements of the Uruguay Round was the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement in which it was settled that regulatory decisions on food safety (with implications for international commerce) must be made on the basis of sound science. The importance of this agreement becomes ever more apparent as the regulation of food safety, and now biotechnology, moves to the forefront of public concern.

Alas, many people have been subjected to misinformation, disinformation and half-truths in this highly emotional area. Advancing the cause of public health is, and will always be, one of the most important responsibilities of governments everywhere. But that is precisely why public policy decisions (whether or not trade is involved) should be objective, handled systematically and professionally and based on the best science available.

This is essentially what the Uruguay Round agreement does. It would be unwise to make changes that permit subjectivity to override objectivity, emotion to override a rational assessment of risk.

Biotechnology and other genetic modifications that may emerge in the coming years can certainly be handled under the aegis of the Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement. There is no need for a separate agreement. Biotechnology is not a new phenomenon and



The **mockingbird** is the state bird of Tennessee. Cordell Hull represented a district of Tennessee in the Congress of the United States, and was elected a

senator from there, before becoming U.S. Secretary of State (1933-44).

Trade Policy Analyses

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genetic alterations have been with us for centuries. Were it not for the "genetic engineering" incorporated in hybrid corn, the rice varieties of the Green Revolution and many other examples, it would not be possible to feed the six billion people who inhabit the earth today.

The pace of genetic change has accelerated and that is sometimes frightening. But that can be handled, in the WTO and elsewhere, in a way that will not sacrifice the potential benefits of that change (in both food production and human medicine).

Environmental regulation has some of the same emotional attributes as food safety and it may provide similar challenges for the WTO system. For those who are concerned that the WTO may impose global rules in these areas at the level of the 'lowest common denominator', one should note that nation states have a sovereign right to establish whatever domestic rules they wish — for environmental protection, food safety, biotechnology regulation or anything else.

When those domestic rules are alleged to stray from the principles of open trade, the countries that are adversely affected may challenge them through the WTO dispute settlement process. That is the way the system should work and the results to date are commendable. Not everyone agrees with every outcome. That is not surprising. Few would argue, though, that the WTO dispute settlement process per se is biased or unprofessional.

Conclusion

Agricultural policy has always posed special challenges. No other industry is exposed to such an array of vicissitudes and vagaries, year after year. If governments are to smooth out that roller coaster ride and make it more comfortable and rewarding for the world's farmers, there is a lot of work to do. The WTO is an excellent place to start and the time is right for further multilateral trade negotiations.

¹ On the course of the Uruguay Round negotiations, see my essay on "Bringing Agriculture into the Multilateral Trading System" in Jagdish Bhagwati and Mathias Hirsch (eds), *The Uruguay Round and Beyond*, Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel (Berlin, Heidelberg and New York: Springer, 1998).

² Julius W. Pratt, *Cordell Hull: 1933-44* (New York: Cooper Square, 1964), and *The Memoirs of Cordell Hull* (New York: Macmillan Company, 1955).

³ See *Trends in International Trade*, Haberler Report (Geneva: GATT Secretariat, 1958). The report was produced by a panel of four eminent economists: Gottfried Haberler (chairman), Roberto d'Oliveira Campos, James E. Meade and Jan Tinbergen. The last two were later awarded Nobel Prizes in Economics.

⁴ See the seminal work by D. Gale Johnson, *World Agriculture in Disarray*, second edition (London: Macmillan, for the Trade Policy Research Centre, 1991; and New York: St Martin's Press, 1991), first published in 1973.

⁵ "Completing the Task", issued after the eighteenth meeting of Cairns Group ministers, Sydney, April 3, 1998.